Reflections on Clausewitz, Book II, Chapter 3 & 4

Chapter 3: Art or Science of War

Science when mere knowing. Art, when doing, is the object.

Both perception and judgement belong to Art; Science is the logical faculties which exist in between.

War is more Art than Science, but truly it is neither; it exists in the realm of social interaction.  It is wrought upon a living and active force.

Chapter 4: Methodicism

Clausewitz begins this chapter by pondering the definitions of several words; I shall attempt to translate them into business terms.

• Law: the strictest term here (and to be understood in the sense of “Laws of Nature”) they are, theoretically, absolute, but carry the seed of subjectivity within them. For instance: “A business must be run at a profit,” is a good law, with subjectivity only entering into things when you consider esoteric situations such as tax write-offs, and PR-friendly charity work.
• Principle: an informal law for action, e.g.: “We should bring products to market which entice our current customer base.” It guides action without delineating with it. When moved away from the objective, it becomes a Maxim; e.g.: “We should provide good quality for the price.” This statement doesn’t refer to an objective truth, rather it points towards a subjective understanding of quality.
• Rule: this term can be used in two manners. It is often used like ‘Law’, but is less definite since all rules have exceptions. “Buy low, sell high” – unless if you have an asset that’s rapidly depreciating, in which case get it off the books.  It can also be used in the sense of ‘ruler’, or the ‘rules of play’ – “As a rule, you use 30% of your clients every year.”
• Directions/Instructions: these determine actions in minor circumstances (“Create the product by following this procedure.”) and for the purposes of strategy can be ignored.
• Methodicism (Doctrine): the methods employed should be aimed at the average – what we would nowadays call “best practices”, encapsulated by systems such as ISO 9001 Quality Management. It isn’t about the particular, but the general.  What practices are assumed, because they ruggedly apply across a variety of adverse circumstances?

When it comes to war, there’s no need to consider Law; where war is simple, there’s no need to state the obvious, and where war is complex, it’s too complex to come up with laws. (In other words – when chaos reigns, you don’t have time to consult an accountant while looking for tax loopholes, and the rest of the time the Law of War can be boiled down to “Kill the other guy, and don’t get killed in the process.”) The important points for consideration are Principles, Rules, and Methods.

With tactics, the Principles can be clearly stated – “Don’t send cavalry against unbroken infantry (except during a special emergency).” Certain behaviours and idiosyncrasies of the enemy army can, as a Rule, point towards a particular feint the enemy is engaged in; it likewise is a Rule to maintain momentum, and harass a breaking line (without falling prey of a pincer manoeuver).

These things are obvious to any tactician worth his salt.  Where the General shows his true genius in the development of Method – what we call nowadays call Doctrine.  Methods are not absolute systems – they allow a great deal of freedom and versatility within them, while still establishing core principles.  Take the strategy of the Gulf War, influenced as it was by Col Boyd’s OODA Loop theory (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act).  The Doctrine of the American military is founded upon Air Superiority – and Gulf War played within that method.  The strategy employed – to undermine Saddam’s ability to orient himself to the battlefield, by striking random targets behind enemy lines – was both creative and free, while still holding to the foundational Doctrine.

The importance of having a solid doctrine can be summed up by the statement “Any plan is better than no plan.” For one thing, this braces the army against the fog of war: while we may not know what the enemy is doing, by having an established doctrine we’re at least able to coordinate amongst ourselves.  Furthermore, even if we knew precisely what the enemy is up to, formulating a new methodology on the fly is all but impossible while the bullets are flying.  Far better to fall back on the habits and methods which are understood by everyone, from the lowliest Private to the civilian Policy Ponderers in Puzzle Palace.

(Note on the “Strategic Corporal”: one of the CF’s doctrines involves an observation from WW2, in that many battles were won despite the leadership being destroyed in the first moments; this is because senior Corporals managed to take command of the company.  While they weren’t fully trained in leadership, the training of their subordinates ensured that the green machine still managed to turn over.)

Granted, at the upper levels it is the less important; rather than numerous small decisions, the General is responsible for a small number of great decisions.  For him, the greatest benefit of an established Doctrine is the predictability of his forces… while being careful that this predictability doesn’t wind up tying the hands of not just his troops, but himself as well.

Doctrine is ultimately subjective. “Fighting the last war” is an artifact of Generals who fail to think lucidly about the changing circumstances; who view Doctrine as an absolute, rather than an arbitrary assertion.  This is the proper view for the troops on the field, but never the General, who must remain abreast of the changing circumstances which affect the character of War.

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